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The overall independence of a firm’s governance system depends not only on the independence of its 
board of directors but also on CEO influence over the other top executives. We find that board 
independence and independence from CEO influence in the executive suite are inversely related. 
Difference-in-difference estimates using a regulatory shock reveal that strengthening board 
independence weakens executive suite independence, which is proxied by (the inverse of) the fraction 
of top executives appointed by a current CEO. We also find that the greater the increase in the fraction 
of the current CEO’s appointees in the executive suite, the lesser the improvement in monitoring CEO 
compensation and the lower the shareholder value enhancement in the aftermath of the regulation. 
These findings imply that one cannot infer overall independence based on board independence alone 
and that strengthening a specific governance mechanism by regulation can have undesirable spillover 
effects to a seemingly unrelated governing body.  
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The two main governing bodies of corporations are the board of directors and the top 
management team, or executive suite, consisting of the CEO and her top lieutenants. Much research has 
been devoted to studying board independence, highlighting the importance of director independence in 
protecting shareholder interest against CEOs’ self-serving behavior.1 But a highly independent board does 
not necessarily ensure an overall independent governance process if governance in the executive suite 
lacks independence from CEO influence.  
Fama (1980) points out the importance of independent non-CEO executives in reducing agency 
problems when he states, “Less well appreciated, however, is the monitoring that takes place from 
bottom to top” (p. 293). In a more recent contribution, Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) show that the 
presence of more top executives with different preferences and dissenting views—independent 
executives—strengthens governance and steers CEOs toward more shareholder friendly decisions. 
Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) also highlight the importance of independence in the executive suite 
when they analyze how governance is shaped by internal monitoring of CEOs by the other top executives. 
As the two main internal governing bodies of a corporation, the board and the executive suite may 
display levels of independence that are closely interrelated. How exactly is board independence related to 
executive suite independence? The answer is not obvious. On one hand, a highly independent board may 
enhance independence in the executive suite through close oversight of the top executive appointment 
process. The board has the authority to appoint or dismiss CEOs; hence by extension, it also may be able 
to influence personnel decisions of the other executives to improve the composition of the top executive 
team.  
                                                 
1 An incomplete list of studies examining the relation between director independence and the strength of board oversight 
and/or firm performance includes Brickley and James (1987); Weisbach (1988); Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990); Byrd and Hickman 
(1992); Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994); Cotter and Zenner (1994); Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996); Mayers, 
Shivdasani, and Smith (1997); Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002); Dahya and McConnell (2007); Chhaochharia and Grinstein  
(2009); Nguyen and Nielsen (2010); Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012); Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2013); and Knyazeva, 
Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013). 
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The CEO, on the other hand, may need a close-knit and cooperative team of top executives for 
efficient coordination of corporate activities. The need for cohesion in the executive suite may be greater 
when the board is more independent. A more independent board with fewer inside and affiliated 
directors may be less effective in advising, thus shifting more of the advisory function to the executive 
suite, which may necessitate a less independent executive suite. The intent may not be so benign, 
however. When the board is highly independent, the CEO is less influential in the boardroom. To make up 
for the lack of influence, the CEO may seek more executive power by filling the executive suite with more 
of his own appointees over whom he can exert greater influence.  
Whatever the case, the CEO will want to form a top executive team of his liking and may succeed 
at it. Although the board is on top of the organizational chart, it meets only a few times a year, and 
independent directors’ work is part-time. Independent directors have limited access to pertinent 
information, relying heavily on management as their primary source of information (Dominguez-Martinez, 
Swank, and Visser, 2008; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). In contrast, the CEO works full-time and 
has employees at his disposal to perform the necessary footwork to make a case to the board. Controlling 
the information channel may give the CEO an effective control over top executive appointment decisions, 
which require private information about why some are appointed while others are being replaced.  
This paper investigates the interrelationship between board independence and executive suite 
independence. We proxy (the inverse of) independence from CEO influence in the executive suite by the 
fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed (FTA) during the current CEO’s tenure. Most CEOs are 
heavily engaged in appointment decisions of their top lieutenants; therefore, the appointees are more 
likely to share similar preferences with, and may be beholden to, the CEO who appointed them than 
executives appointed by a previous CEO. When a CEO has more of his own appointees, his internal 
influence in the executive suite increases through what social psychologists refer to as “social influence,” 
which relies on norms of reciprocity, liking, and social consensus to shape management’s decision making 
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(Cialdini, 1984). This way of measuring CEO influence is not new.2 Landier et al. (2013) measure CEO 
influence in the executive suite by the fraction of top four non-CEO executives hired by a current CEO. Our 
measure is more inclusive, however, as we include executives promoted from within the firm.3  
We begin our empirical investigation by relating FTA to the percentage of independent directors 
and other factors that may be related to FTA with firm fixed effects. The sample period is 1996 – 2006. We 
find FTA is positively related to the percentage of independent directors on the board, implying that 
executive suite independence is negatively related to board independence. It appears one cannot assess a 
firm’s overall independence of governance structure based on board independence alone. 
Because board independence is endogenous (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), our investigation of 
a causal relation utilizes an exogenous shock on board independence—the mandate for NYSE- and 
NASDAQ listed firms to have a majority of independent directors by 2004. The variation for difference-in-
differences estimation comes from the pre-regulation board composition; the treatment group is firms 
without a majority of independent directors prior to the regulation. Since firms affected and unaffected by 
the regulation may not be comparable, we use propensity-scores to construct the control group. Reported 
estimates are based on both propensity-score matched and unmatched samples. 
Regardless of which sample is used, we find that the independent board requirement has 
significantly reduced independence in the executive suite. The point estimates imply that, following the 
regulation, treated firms replace, on average, about 18% more top executives appointed by previous CEOs 
than the control group. The regulatory effect on executive suite independence is robust to possible 
confounding effects associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and other events in 2000 and 2001,4 
                                                 
2 Morse, Nanda and Seru (2011) and Coles et al. (2013) rely on a similar notion of reciprocity between directors and the CEO 
when they measure how “co-opted” a board is by the fraction of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. 
3 Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2013) demonstrate the usefulness of FTA as a measure of CEO connectedness within executive suite 
when they provide evidence that higher FTA facilitates management wrongdoing, helps evade its detection, and reduces the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal upon detection. 
4 Although the board regulation was promulgated around the same time as the enactment of the SOX, it is distinct from the 
SOX and under purview of different organizations. 
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executive turnovers, and major structural changes within the firm. The results are also robust to 
alternative measures of FTA and sample construction.  
How does the post-regulation increase in FTA affect the newly independent board’s monitoring of 
the CEO and protection of shareholder value, which the regulation is intended to strengthen? The answer 
depends on what led to the higher FTA. It could be a result of the newly independent board demanding 
new blood in the executive suite to improve firm performance, leading to greater than normal executive 
turnovers. Or it could be a substitution effect: The newly independent board strengthens monitoring but is 
less helpful in advising, necessitating a change in the executive suite, which might be an efficient response 
to the reduced inside and affiliated director presence on the board. Neither scenario predicts the higher 
FTA will weaken regulatory impacts on board oversight or protection of shareholder value.  
However, the higher FTA could be a result of the CEO’s attempt to recoup the loss of influence in 
the boardroom by filling the executive suite with more of his appointees, which may help build a more 
united front against the board. Then, the higher FTA may impede improvement in board monitoring. 
Moreover, if the higher FTA is achieved by giving a higher priority to building a more closely aligned top 
executive team rather than finding the best combination of experience and talent, firm performance is 
likely to suffer. Such a management team might be more susceptible to collusion, which Fama (1980) 
warns against: “top management may decide that collusion and expropriation of security holder wealth 
are better than competition among themselves” (p. 293).  
We test the alternative predictions by relating changes in FTA to regulatory impacts on board 
monitoring and shareholder value. Proxies for the strength of board monitoring are CEO compensation 
and pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS). A number of studies show that in the absence of adequate 
monitoring, CEOs pay themselves what they can (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000, 2001; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004; and Morse et al., 2011). Shareholder value is proxied by Tobin’s Q. We first relate 
changes in these proxies to post-regulation changes in FTA. To calculate the changes, we collapse the 
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panel data to cross-sectional data for each CEO who was the CEO in the pre-regulation base-year 2001. 
We find that given the regulatory impact, CEO compensation decreases less and PPS increases less, the 
greater the increase in FTA post-regulation. In other words, the higher FTA reduces the improvement in 
newly independent boards’ monitoring of CEO compensation. Changes in FTA also seem negatively related 
to the regulatory impact on Tobin’s Q, but the relation is insignificant. 
Post-regulation changes in FTA may be affected by time-varying omitted variables related to CEO 
compensation, PPS, or Q. Our second test addresses this problem by using cross-sectional differences in 
pre-regulation FTA. FTA is bounded between zero and one; thus, FTA in 2001, the pre-regulation base-
year, measures a firm’s capacity to increase FTA in response to the regulation. If it is equal to one (zero), 
the firm has no (ample) room to increase FTA. Although this test is indirect, FTA in 2001 is unaffected by 
time-varying omitted variables. The results on CEO compensation and PPS are robust. Moreover, the 
capacity to increase FTA is negatively and significantly related to the regulatory impact on Tobin’s Q.  
This paper documents that independence from CEO influence in the executive suite is inversely 
related to board independence. The interplay between the two main internal governing bodies has 
important impacts on the overall efficacy of monitoring CEOs and on shareholder value in ways that 
challenge the presumption that mandated independent boards are good for all firms. This does not 
contradict the widely-held view that independent directors help strengthen board oversight. Rather, our 
evidence illustrates that when one aspect of governance is regulated, some firms shift other aspects of 
governance. When regulators contemplate improving a specific governance mechanism, therefore, they 
should carefully consider spillovers to other governing mechanisms. 
This study also fills a void in the literature on CEO influence and involvement in the selection of 
top echelon players governing the firm. Previous studies examine CEO influence on selecting board 
members and the outcomes (e.g., Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 
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2012; Coles et al., 2013). We add to this literature by studying the appointment and composition of the 
other main governing body—the executive suite.  
The next section describes our empirical design and data. Section 3 estimates the relation 
between board independence and executive suite independence, and conducts a battery of robustness 
tests. Section 4 examines how post-regulation changes in FTA affect regulatory impacts on board 
monitoring and shareholder value. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Empirical Design and Data 
2.1. Proxy for Independence in the Executive Suite  
Our main proxy for (the inverse of) independence from CEO influence in the executive suite is the 
fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during a CEO’s tenure (FTA). Executives who are hired 
or promoted to the top positions by a CEO may feel more loyal and obligated to the CEO than those 
appointed by a previous CEO. FTAit is the number of executives hired or promoted to the top four non-CEO 
positions during the tenure of firm i’s CEO as of year t, divided by four. Hence, it ranges from zero to one 
in increments of 0.25. Top four non-CEO executives are identified from ExecuComp, which ranks 
executives by the sum of salaries and bonuses. To prevent changes in the reported number of executives 
from affecting within-firm variation in FTA, we drop firm-year observations when ExecuComp reports less 
than four non-CEO executives.5 We assume the year a non-CEO executive first appears on the list of top 
four non-CEO executives is the year she obtained the position. We compare this year with the year a 
current CEO took office to determine whether the executive is appointed during the CEO’s tenure.  
2.2. Empirical Methodology 
We first relate FTA to the percentage of independent directors and other factors that may be 
related to FTA with firm fixed effects. Then we identify a causal relation by estimating difference-in-
                                                 
5Kim and Lu (2011) illustrate the importance of keeping the number of executives constant when constructing executive 
variables for panel regressions with firm fixed effects. Cross-checking against proxy statements shows that missing executives in 
ExecuComp are due to omission rather than to dismissal; hence, the restriction does not seem to introduce a selection bias.  
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differences using a regulatory shock on board independence. The deadline for compliance with the 
independent board requirement was October 31, 2004; however, many firms that lacked a majority of 
independent directors began to change their board structure when the recommendations were 
promulgated by the exchanges in 2002. The largest changes occurred in 2002 and 2003. Thus, we use 2001 
as the base-year to define which firms are affected by the regulation and 2003 as the first year of the post-
regulation period. We treat 2002 as the transition period and exclude observations during that year. 
2.2.1. Baseline Specification  
Our baseline regression for difference-in-difference estimation is: 
    Yit = ai + at + β1Dep_Board2001i*Postt + β2Xit + εit                                      (1) 
Yit is a measure of firm i’s level of independence in the executive suite as of year t. Dep_Board2001i is the 
affected firm indicator, equal to one if firm i does not have a majority of independent directors in 2001, 
and zero otherwise. This indicator is interacted with Postt, the post-regulation indicator, equal to one if 
year t is 2003 or later. The regression includes firm- and year fixed effects, ai and at. Because of these fixed 
effects, the specification does not contain a separate term for Dep_Board2001i or Postt. X is a vector of 
time-varying control variables. When estimation is based on an unmatched sample, standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Appendix 1 contains definitions of all variables. 
2.2.2. Propensity-score Matching 
In a difference-in-differences estimation, the outcome variable of the control group is used to 
calculate the expected counterfactual to control for time trend effects. It assumes that the treatment and 
control groups have the same time trend if there are no regulatory changes—the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA). Since CIA may not be valid, our control group is constructed by 
propensity scores following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We match firms based on information in 2001, 
the base-year used to determine whether a firm is affected or unaffected by the regulation. Ideally, the 
independent variables used to estimate the Probit model must include all factors affecting both the 
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likelihood of being affected by the regulation (board independence) and regulation outcome (FTA). Linck, 
Netter, and Yang (2008) show that board independence is affected by firm complexity, costs of monitoring, 
ownership incentive, and CEO characteristics.  
 Our matching criteria incorporate all the four factors identified by Linck et al. (2008): Firm 
complexity is captured by firm size, firm age,6 and the number of business segments within a firm. To 
capture costs of monitoring, we use EBITDA/TA, Tobin’s Q, and board size. Ownership incentive is 
measured by the percentage share ownership held by a CEO. CEO characteristics include log of CEO age, 
an indicator for a CEO chairing the board, and CEO gender. These factors are also likely to affect FTA. We 
also include variables that are specifically related to FTA: CEO tenure,7 an indicator for CEOs hired from 
outside, the average tenure of top four non-CEO executives in the top four positions (EXECSEN), and the 
fraction of top four executives appointed during a CEO's first year in office (FTA_1Y). We also add the 
fraction of executives whose first year as a top four non-CEO executive can be identified from ExecuComp 
(KNOWN).  This controls noise in FTA and EXECSEN arising from the ambiguity about the precise year of 
some of the top four executive appointments.8 Likewise, we add the fraction of top executives whom we 
cannot determine whether they are appointed during a CEO's first year in office (FTA_1Y _Unknown). This 
variable helps control noise in FTA_1Y.  
 One affected firm is matched to the three nearest unaffected firms using the Mahalanobis 
distance metric. We exclude all observations that do not satisfy the common support condition. Log 
likelihood, Prob > Chi2, and Pseudo R2 for estimating the propensity scores are -293.14, 0.00, and 0.13. We 
bootstrap 200 times to correct standard errors for all OLS regressions estimated with matched samples. 
                                                 
6 Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) suggest that complexity increases with firm age. 
7 If a CEO leaves the position and returns later, ExecuComp reports only the latest appointment date. Thus simply comparing 
the CEO appointment date reported by ExecuComp with the current year may generate negative CEO tenure. We correct for 
this problem by backtracking the previous appointment year using the CEO and company names. 
8 If an executive is already one of the top four non-CEO executives at the firm’s first appearance in ExecuComp, we cannot 
determine the year of her appointment. For such an executive, we use the year the executive joined the company as the year 




2.3. Sample Construction 
Our sample is constructed with NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed firms for which we have information on 
board composition in 2001. Data sources include ExecuComp for executive data; RiskMetrics for board 
structure and independent director data; BoardEx for information on directors’ and CEOs’ education 
background, past employment, and membership in social organizations; Compustat for accounting data; 
and CRSP for stock return data. To avoid ambiguity about who constitutes the current CEO, we drop firm-
year observations when a new CEO’s first year overlaps with the last year of the previous CEO. 
The sample period covers 1996 – 2006, excluding 2002. We begin with 1996 to include sufficient 
pre-regulation observations. We end in 2006 because late 2007 was the beginning of the financial crisis, a 
rare event that led to unusual changes in the executive suite unrelated to the regulation. In addition, 
RiskMetrics modified the definition of independent directors in 2007, making it difficult to compare board 
composition before and after 2007.  
Table 1 lists, by year, the number of firms in the full sample, which contains 8,975 firm-year 
observations associated with 1,035 unique firms. Panel A reports the number of firms in the treatment 
and control group for the unmatched full sample. It shows 85.57% of firms had a majority of independent 
directors in 2001, the base-year, indicating 14.43% were affected by the new rule. It also shows the 
biggest change in the percentage of firms with a majority of independent directors took place between 
2001 and 2003.9   
The number of unaffected firms in the matched sample (Panel B) is substantially fewer than three 
times the number of affected firms. This is due to multiple matches of treated firms to same unaffected 
firms. Both unmatched and matched samples are not balanced. The results are robust when we re-
estimate regressions using a balanced sample.    
                                                 
9 Despite the October 31, 2004, deadline, Column (2) does not show full compliance with the regulation in 2005 or 2006, a 
pattern also reported by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) for 2004 and 2005. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein correctly attribute the lack of full compliance to the stricter definitions of director independence by 
the data source than by the exchanges. In 2007, RiskMetrics modified the definition and the data collection process to conform 
to the exchanges’ definition. With these changes, the compliance rate in 2007 jumps to 99.47%.  
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2.4. Summary Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A provides summary statistics for the unmatched full sample. The mean and median 
FTA is 0.44 and 0.50, implying about half of the top-four non-CEO executives are appointed during a 
current CEO’s tenure. Post has a mean of 0.44, indicating fairly evenly distributed observations between 
pre- and post-regulation periods. The average board has 9.8 directors. The average CEO tenure is 6.9 
years, female CEOs represent 1%, the average CEO share ownership is 2%, and 66% of CEOs chair the 
board. The average firm is 27 years old and has 15 business segments.  
Panel B compares affected and unaffected firms in the matched sample at the time of matching, 
the base-year 2001. Most firm and CEO characteristic variables show insignificant differences between the 
treatment and control group, with a few exceptions. The exceptions exist because the propensity score 
matching is based on the overall similarity. 
As expected, affected firms show a much lower percentage of independent directors. Affected 
firms also show significantly lower FTA, indicating greater independence in the executive suite. The 
significantly lower FTA is robust to alternative ways of measuring it: AFTA is an abnormal measure of FTA, 
the residual of a regression relating FTA to variables mechanically related to it, such as CEO tenure, with 
year fixed effects; WFTA is FTA weighted by non-CEO executives’ salaries and bonuses; and WAFTA is an 
abnormal measure of WFTA. Since these statistics are based on 2001 data, a pre-regulation year, the 
significant differences suggest that, absent regulation, firms with a dependent board tend to have more 
independent executive suites. 
3. Relation between Board Independence and Independence in the Executive Suite  
3.1. The Fraction of Independent Directors and FTA  
 To estimate the general relationship between the two types of independence, we begin with a 
panel regression relating FTA to the percentage of independent directors. The regression controls for firm- 
and year fixed effects. We also control for time-varying firm- and CEO characteristics that may influence 
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FTA and board independence. Controls for firm characteristics include Ln(TotalAssets), log of the book 
value of total assets; FirmAge, one plus the number of years from the firm’s IPO or the number of years 
since its first appearance in CRSP; and Segment, the number of business segments as reported by 
Compustat Segments. Controls for CEO characteristics include Ln(CEOAge), log of a CEO’s age; CEO_OWN, 
the percentage of outstanding shares a CEO owns; CEO_Chair, an indicator for a CEO chairing the board; 
and Female, an indicator for a CEO’s gender. Firm size, the number of segments, and CEO share ownership 
are lagged by one year. We also control for the variables mechanically correlated to FTA: CEOTEN, CEO 
tenure; OUTSIDE, an indicator for CEOs hired from outside; EXECSEN, the average tenure of top four non-
CEO executives; and FTA_1Y, the fraction of top four executives appointed during a CEO's first year in 
office. KNOWN and FTA_1Y_Unknown are also added to control noise in FTA, EXECSEN, and FTA_1Y.  
Table 3 presents the estimation results. The first column reports OLS results. The coefficient on 
the percentage of independent directors, Pct_Ind_Dir, is positive and significant. Because FTA is the 
inverse of executive suite independence, the positive coefficient implies that independence in the 
executive suite is inversely related to board independence. The second column estimates the relation 
using the Ordered Logistic regression because FTA takes ordered discrete values. The results are robust. 
As expected, FTA is greater, the longer the CEO tenure and the shorter the average tenure of non-
CEO top executives. Other control variables indicate that the older a CEO and the fewer shares a CEO 
owns, the greater is FTA.  
3.2. Difference-in-difference Estimates 
The above estimation results do not allow us to infer a causal relation because the percentage of 
independent directors is endogenous. In this section we use the independent board requirement as an 
external shock and estimate its impact on FTA with the baseline difference-in-differences specification. 
Control variables are the same as before.  
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Table 4 reports difference-in-differences estimates. Odd-numbered columns report OLS estimates 
for the unmatched and the propensity-score matched sample. The coefficient on Dep_Board2001*Post, 
the estimated regulatory effect, is positive and significant at the one percent level, irrespective of whether 
the sample is unmatched or matched. Ologit estimates, reported in even-numbered columns, are 
consistent with the OLS results. All estimates imply the external shock increasing board independence 
weakens independence in the executive suite. 
The coefficient on Dep_Board2001*Post in Column (1) implies that the regulation leads to 0.41 
(0.102/0.25) more top executive appointed by the current CEO (one new appointment increases FTA by 
0.25). This impact is economically meaningful. The mean FTA in 2001 was 0.437, which means the average 
number of top executives appointed by previous CEOs is 2.25 ((1 - 0.437)/0.25)) in the base-year. Thus, the 
point estimate implies about 18% (0.41/2.25) more replacement of previous CEOs’ appointees.  
Coefficients on the control variables are largely consistent across the four regressions. As 
expected, FTA is positively related to the length of the CEO tenure, negatively related to the average 
tenure of non-CEO executives, and positively related to the fraction of top executives appointed during a 
CEO's first year in office. Interestingly, older CEOs appoint more executives during their tenure, whereas 
CEOs with greater share ownership and female CEOs are less likely to do so. Larger and older firms with 
fewer business segments tend to have a higher FTA.  
The affected firm indicator, Dep_Board2001i, may be too crude. Consider two affected firms, one 
with 40% and another with 10% of independent directors in 2001. Clearly, the latter is more affected by 
the regulation and may react more strongly. We re-estimate all regressions with the interaction of the 
percentage of non-independent directors in 2001, Pct_Dep_Board2001i, and the post-regulation indicator. 
The results are reported in Table 5. The estimates indicate that the more a firm is affected by the 




3.3.  Robustness Tests 
In this section we check the robustness of our results to confounding effects, alternative 
explanations, alternative FTA measures, and an alternative sample construction.  
3.3.1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 While the independent board requirement proposal was under consideration by the SEC, the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act was enacted in 2002. Titles 1 through 4 of the SOX are designed to enhance financial 
transparency, disclosure practices, and internal controls.10 These are of concern because firms with 
dependent boards may differ in those aspects from firms with independent boards and, hence, may be 
affected differently by the SOX. 
To check whether the treatment group was different from the control group in those dimensions 
before the regulation, we examine whether the firms in the treatment group engaged in more earnings 
management than the control group during the base year 2001. A commonly used proxy for earnings 
management is discretionary accruals (DAC), those parts of total accruals over which management have 
discretion. Total accruals are computed as the difference between earnings and operating cash flows.11 To 
identify the discretionary components of total accruals, we follow Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) by 
regressing total accruals on the inverse of total assets in the previous fiscal year; the change in sales less 
the change in accounts receivable; and property, plant, and equipment. Discretionary accruals (DAC) are 
the regression residuals.   
For each firm in our sample, we calculate this measure of DAC in 2001 and compute its correlation 
with the affected firm indicator. The idea is to see whether before the regulation, the treated firms 
engaged in more earnings management than the control group. If they did, SOX would have more impact 
on treated firms, raising the possibility that our results are contaminated by the SOX.  We find no such 
                                                 
10 The SOX contains 11 Titles. Titles 5 through 7 focus on financial analysts, securities professionals, credit agencies, and 
investment banks. Titles 8 through 11 include provisions for prevention and detection of corporate frauds.  
11 Specifically, they are the change between non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities, excluding those due 




evidence:  The correlation between the affected firm indicator and DAC in 2001 is 0.023 with P-value 
equal to 0.512, indicating no differential SOX effects between the treated firms and the control group. It 
seems safe to conclude that our results are not driven by the SOX. 
3.3.2. Other Confounding Events 
Our results may be confounded by other events affecting the market for top executives around 
the time when the regulation was promulgated. For example, the dotcom bubble burst in 2000 and the 
9/11 attack in 2001 may have led to fewer top executive hires and promotions during 2000-2002, lowering 
FTA during those years and leading to the appearance of higher FTA in later years. But for this confounding 
story to explain our difference-in-differences results, the impacts of the bubble and 9/11 events must be 
greater on treated firms than the control group. We have difficulty finding a plausible scenario that can 
explain the differential impact.  
Nevertheless, we follow the approach used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) to examine 
whether our results are contaminated by confounding effects. Specifically, we replace the post-regulation 
indicator with dummies for 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005-2006.  The estimation results are reported 
in Table 6. If our results are confounded by the events in 2000 and 2001, the interaction of 
Dep_Board2001 and year dummy should be negative for 2000 or 2001; however, they are all insignificant 
with mostly positive signs. By contrast, the interaction terms are positive and significant for all post-
regulation years.  
Interestingly, coefficients on the interaction of the dependent board indicator and post-regulation 
year dummies show an increasing trend over time. Because it takes time to replace top executives through 
new hires and promotions, the time trend is also consistent with our conclusion that the shock on board 
independence has triggered an increase in FTA. 
3.3.3. Alternative Explanations  
Are results driven by executive turnovers? 
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The increase in FTA may simply reflect greater executive turnover. Newly independent boards may 
demand new blood in the executive suite to improve performance, leading to more executive and CEO 
turnovers than usual. To examine this possibility, we add the percentage of top executives changed and an 
indicator for CEO turnover as controls in Table 7, Panel A. The executive turnover ratio is measured by the 
percent of top four non-CEO executives in year t not on the list of top four non-CEO executives in year t-1. 
The CEO turnover indicator is equal to one if a CEO in year t is not the same as the CEO in year t-2. We 
compare with year t-2 for CEOs because the sample does not include CEOs’ first year in the office to avoid 
the overlap of the new and the old CEO.  As expected, FTA is positively related to executive turnovers and 
negatively related to CEO turnovers. Nonetheless, the regulatory effect on FTA, the coefficient on the 
interaction term, remains positive and significant at the one percent level irrespective of whether the 
sample is unmatched or matched.  
Are results driven by structure-changing events? 
Organizational structure-changing events such as mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, and 
spinoffs are often accompanied by changes in the executive suite, which is one reason we control for the 
number of segments in all regressions. In Panel B of Table 7, we control for the number of mergers and 
acquisitions, MAit-1, and divestitures and spinoffs, DSit-1, completed in the prior year. The data for MA and 
DS are obtained from SDC. The results are robust.  
3.3.4. Alternative Definitions of FTA 
Our measure of FTA treats all top four non-CEO executives equally. However, executives with 
higher salaries and bonuses tend to be more influential, and CEO influence over them may matter more. 
So we calculate a compensation weighted FTA, 
WFTAit  =      Exe_Comkit /        Exe_Comjit.                                                                        (2) 
Exe_Comkit is the sum of salary and bonus of executive k appointed during the tenure of firm i’s 















follow Landier et al. (2003) and estimate residuals of a regression relating FTA to CEOTEN, OUTSIDE, 
EXECSEN, KNOWN, FTA_1Y, FTA_1Y_Unknown with year fixed effects. The residuals are used as a measure 
of the abnormal fraction of top executives appointed, AFTA, during a CEO’s tenure. We also calculate AFTA 
weighted by the executives’ salaries and bonuses, WAFTA, by estimating the same regression with WFTA 
as the dependent variable. When these abnormal measures of FTA are used as dependent variables, the 
regressions do not include independent variables used to estimate the residuals. Re-estimation results 
based on these three alternative measures are reported in Table 8. The results are robust regardless of 
which alternative measure is used.  
3.3.5. Alternative Sample Constructions  
Finally, we check the robustness to possible biases arising from an unbalanced sample by re-
estimating regressions with a balanced sample of 830 firms that exist during the period 1999-2006. We 
exclude observations in 2002 and 2003 so that the pre- and post-regulation periods have the sample 
number of years. In this sample, 2004 is the first year fully affected by the regulation. The rest is the same. 
The re-estimation results (unreported) are robust. 
4. Efficacy of Monitoring CEOs and Shareholder Value 
There are three possible explanations for the robust evidence of higher FTA following the 
regulation. As mentioned in the Introduction, the first is the newly independent board’s demand for new 
blood in the executive suite. The second is a substitution effect; it may be an efficient response to the 
reduced presence of inside and affiliated directors on the board, shifting more of the advisory function to 
the executive suite. Neither of these scenarios predicts that the higher FTA will adversely affect the 
regulatory impact on board monitoring or shareholder value.  
However, the higher FTA could be a result of the CEO’s successful attempt to increase executive 
power to recoup the loss of influence in the boardroom. By filling the executive suite with more of his own 
appointees over whom he can exert greater influence than those appointed by previous CEOs, the CEO 
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can form a more united front against the newly independent board’s oversight. Under this scenario, the 
higher FTA is likely to hinder improvement in board monitoring and may lower shareholder value 
enhancement.  
To test the competing predictions, we relate changes in FTA to the improvement in monitoring 
and shareholder value. Monitoring effectiveness is proxied by CEO compensation and pay-for-
performance sensitivity (PPS). CEO compensation, CEO_Comp, is item tdc1 in ExecuComp, which includes 
salary, bonus, the total value of restricted stocks and stock options granted, long-term incentive payments, 
and other miscellaneous compensation. CEO PPS is measured by CEO_Delta, which is the Edmans, Gabaix, 
and Landier (2009) measure of scaled wealth-performance sensitivity.12 Shareholder value is proxied by 
Tobin’s Q, as measured by the sum of the market value of common stocks plus the book value of total 
liabilities divided by the book value of total assets.  
Our identification strategy employs two approaches: First, we relate post-regulation changes in 
FTA to changes in CEO compensation, CEO PPS, and Tobin’s Q. However, post-regulation changes in FTA 
may be affected by time-varying omitted variables related to CEO compensation, CEO PPS, or Tobin’s Q. 
To address this problem, we estimate firm fixed effects regressions using cross-sectional differences in FTA 
in the base-year 2001, which measures the capacity to increase FTA in response to the regulation. 
Although this is an indirect test, FTA in 2001 is unaffected by time-varying omitted variables. 
4.1. Changes in FTA and the Impact of the Independent Board Requirement 
∆FTA, ∆Ln(CEO_Comp), ∆CEO_Delta, and ∆Q are changes in FTA, Ln(CEO_Comp), CEO_Delta, and Q 
from pre-regulation to post-regulation periods. The changes are the differences in the averages of each 
variable for up to four years over 1998-2001 and 2003-2006 that overlap with the tenure of each CEO who 
was the CEO in 2001. Only observations in which a CEO was the CEO in 2001 are included to avoid 
                                                 
12 Previous studies suggest two other ways to measure the pay-for-performance sensitivity: dollar change in wealth for a dollar 
change in firm value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) or dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value (Hall and 
Liebman, 1998).  We use Edmans et al.’s (2009) compensation scaled wealth-performance sensitivity measure because, as they 




calculating changes in CEO compensation, CEO PPS, and Tobin’s Q over different CEOs of a same firm. To 
construct the changes, the panel data is collapsed to cross-sectional data such that each observation is 
associated with one firm.  
We estimate the following regression: 
∆Yi = λ1Dep_Board2001i + λ2Dep_Board2001i*∆FTAi   +λ3∆FTAi   +λ5∆Xi + εi.         (3)    
∆Yi is ∆Ln(CEO_Comp), ∆CEO_Delta, or ∆Q. Dep_Board2001i*∆FTAi is the key independent variable. 
The regression estimates how changes in FTA from the pre- to post-regulation periods affect the 
regulatory impact on CEO compensation, PPS, or Q. ∆Xi is a vector of control variables, which are also 
differences between the up to four-year pre- and post-regulation periods overlapping with the tenure of 
each CEO who was the CEO in 2001. All estimations are based on the unmatched sample. The propensity-
score-matched sample becomes really small when we collapse the panel data into cross-sectional data. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level as defined by the three-digit SIC code.  
Control variables include firm size, Ln(TotalAssets); the number of business segments, Segment; 
and EBIDA divided by total assets, EBITDA/TA. These variables may be related to CEO compensation, firm 
performance, and FTA. Because the incentive contract portion of CEO compensation is likely to reflect risk, 
we add two proxies for firm risk: Risk, the standard error of the residuals from the market model 
estimated using daily data for the period covered by the annual sample; and R&D/PPE, the ratio of 
research and development expenditures to property, plant, and equipment. These are commonly used 
proxies for firm risk (e.g., Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999; Kim and Lu, 2011; Coles et al., 2013). To 
avoid reducing the sample size due to missing observations, we follow Himmelberg et al. (1999) and set 
R&D/PPE and Risk equal to zero if they are missing, and use dummy variables, RDUM and RiskD, which are 
set to one if R&D/PPE and Risk are available and zero otherwise.  
We also control for changes in the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with 
independent directors, ∆Dir_Tie. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that if regulation forces a board to 
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appoint more independent directors than endogenously determined, affected firms may attempt to 
circumvent the regulation by recruiting independent directors with more “disutility for monitoring.” 
Directors socially pre-connected to the CEO could be those with disutility for monitoring (Fracassi and Tate, 
2012). In Appendix 2 we examine how the board regulation has affected CEOs’ network connections with 
independent directors by estimating difference-in-differences. The results suggest that the regulation has 
led to an increase in CEOs’ pre-existing network ties with independent directors.  
Appendix 2 also describes how we measure CEOs’ pre-existing network ties. Network ties are 
missing when BoardEx does not cover the relevant individual. Even when they are not missing, BoardEx 
sometimes provides insufficient information to determine whether the connections occurred during 
overlapping years. To avoid reducing the sample size, we assign zero connection when information on 
network ties is missing or incomplete. This leads to underestimation of network ties. To counter the 
underestimation problem, we include Dir_Tie_Unknown, the percent of independent directors whose pre-
existing network ties to their CEOs are either missing or incomplete.  
Table 9 reports the estimation results. For CEO compensation, ∆FTA*Dep_Board2001 shows a 
positive coefficient significant at 5%, while the coefficient of Dep_Board2001 is negative and marginally 
significant (P-value = 0.105). Together, they suggest the greater the increase in FTA post-regulation, the 
smaller the decrease in CEO compensation following the regulation. For CEO delta, ∆FTA*Dep_Board2001 
shows a negative coefficient significant at 10%, while the coefficient of Dep_Board2001 is positive and 
marginally significant (P-value = 0.112). It appears the greater the post-regulation increase in FTA, the less 
the improvement in the board’s monitoring CEO compensation. For Q, the coefficient on 
∆FTA*Dep_Board2001 is negative but insignificant.  
4.2. The Capacity to Increase FTA and the Impact of the Independent Board Requirement 
How much a firm can increase FTA in response to the regulation depends on its pre-regulation FTA. 
FTA is bounded at zero and one; hence, FTA_2001, the FTA in the base-year 2001, measures (the inverse 
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of) the capacity to increase FTA in response to the shock. If FTA_2001 = 1, the firm has no room to 
increase FTA, making the regulation binding; if FTA_2001 = 0, the firm has the full capacity to increase FTA. 
Thus, we use FTA_2001 to infer the likelihood to increase FTA in response to the regulation. With this ex-
ante measure of possible changes in FTA, we are able to make the full use of panel data with firm fixed 
effects regression. Specifically, we relate the cross-sectional difference in FTA_2001 to regulatory impacts 
on the efficacy of monitoring CEO compensation and on shareholder value with the regression: 
Yit = ai + at + θ1Dep_Board2001i*Postt + θ2Dep_Board2001i*Postt*FTA_2001i   + θ3Postt*FTA_2001i    
+ θ5Xit + εit .                                                                                                             (4)                                                 
Yit is Ln(CEO_Comp)it, CEO_Deltait, or Qit. Again, we include only observations in which a CEO was the CEO 
in 2001 to focus on regulatory impacts on CEOs whose compensation, PPS, and Q are observed both pre- 
and post-regulation. The specification does not contain a separate term for Dep_Board2001i*FTA_2001i, 
because both Dep_Board2001i and FTA_2001i are time invariant and subsumed by firm fixed effects. 
Control variables include all controls in Table 9, plus CEO tenure, CEO age, and firm age.13  
Table 10 reports estimation results. Odd-numbered columns provide difference-in-differences 
estimates without accounting for differences in FTA_2001. No estimation results show significant 
regulatory effect except for the positive coefficient at 10% for CEO delta in Column (3). However, when we 
allow for differences in the capacity to increase FTA by interacting FTA_2001i with Dep_Board2001i*Postt 
in even-numbered columns, the triple-interaction term shows significant coefficients for all three 
dependent variables.  
For CEO compensation, the coefficient of the triple-interaction term is negative and significant, 
implying that given the regulatory impact, the smaller the capacity to increase FTA (higher FTA_2001), the 
lower is the CEO compensation. The estimation results for CEO delta show a positive and significant 
coefficient on the triple interaction term, implying given the regulatory impact, the smaller the capacity to 
                                                 
13 In Table 9, we do not control for CEO tenure, CEO age, and firm age because we keep the CEO fixed and changes in those 
variables simply reflect the time change between pre- and post-regulation.  
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increase FTA (higher FTA_2001), the greater the increase in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
Estimation results for Q suggest that these effects on board monitoring carry over to shareholder value. 
The coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive and significant, suggesting that given the 
regulatory impact, Q is higher, the smaller the capacity to increase FTA.  
In sum, whether post-regulation changes in executive suite independence are measured based on 
ex-post changes in FTA or the capacity to increase it, a decrease in executive suite independence seems to 
reduce the regulatory impact of strengthening boards’ monitoring of CEOs. This negative effect carries 
over to shareholder value, reducing the regulatory impact on shareholder value enhancement. The higher 
post-regulation FTA seems attributable to CEOs’ successful attempts to counter newly independent 
boards’ oversight with stronger influence within the executive suite. 
5. Conclusion  
Our empirical investigation reveals that board independence is negatively related to 
independence in the executive suite. Thus, inferring the overall independence of a firm’s governing 
process by board independence alone could be misleading. When board independence is strong (weak), 
the overall independence is likely to be weaker (stronger) than board independence alone indicates.  
Both simple panel regression estimates and difference-in-differences estimates using an external 
shock suggest that strengthening board independence leads to weaker independence from CEO influence 
in the executive suite. This, in turn, seems to diminish the intended benefits of the board regulation. We 
find that the greater the post-regulation increase in FTA or capacity to increase FTA, the smaller the 
improvement in the newly independent board’s monitoring of CEO compensation and the lower the 
enhancement of shareholder value. 
These results imply that a shock in board independence triggers a reaction in the executive suite, 
moderating the effect the shock has on the overall strength of the firm’s governance. Thus, the main 
message our findings deliver to policy makers is that regulating a specific governance mechanism can 
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spillover to seemingly unrelated governing bodies with undesirable consequences. Therefore, when policy 
makers target a specific governance mechanism, they should carefully evaluate how their new regulatory 
actions affect other governing bodies and weigh the potential benefits against the costs associated with 
possible undesirable consequences.  
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Appendix 1: Variable Description.  
 
 Board Composition Variables 
Dep_Board2001 
 
Dependent board indicator equal to one if a firm does not have a majority of independent 
directors in 2001; zero, otherwise. 
Pct_Dep_Board2001 The percentage of non-independent directors on the board in 2001. 
Pct_Ind_Dir The percentage of independent directors on the board. 
Executive Suite Composition Variables 
FTA Fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure.  
AFTA Abnormal fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure.  
WFTA 
 
Fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure, weighted 
by the sum of executives’ salaries and bonuses. 
WAFTA 
 
Abnormal fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure, 
weighted by the sum of executives’ salaries and bonuses. 




Logged value of a CEO’s total compensation (item tdc1 in ExecuComp), which includes 
salary, bonus, total value of restricted stocks and stock options granted, long-term incentive 




Dollar change in CEO wealth for a 100 percentage point change in firm value, divided by 
annual flow compensation, a delta measure proposed by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier 
(2009). Downloaded from Edmans’ website (http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/data.html). 
Tobin’s Q 
 
The market value of common equity plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the 
book value of total assets.  
Other Variables 
Post Post-regulation indicator, equal to one if year t is 2003 or thereafter; zero, otherwise. 
Num_Ind_Dir The number of independent directors on the board. 
BoardSize The total number of directors on the board.  
CEOTEN The number of years a CEO has been in office. 
OUTSIDE Outsider indicator equal to one, if a CEO comes from outside the firm; zero, otherwise. 
FTA_1Y The fraction of top executives appointed within the year of a new CEO appointment. 
FTA_1Y_Unknown 
 
The fraction of top four non-CEO executives whose information on whether they are 
appointed within the year of a new CEO appointment is unknown. 
KNOWN 
 
The fraction of executives whose first year on the list of the top four non-CEO executives can 
be identified with data in ExecuComp. 
EXECSEN 
 
The average number of years top four non-CEO executives have been on the list of the top 
four non-CEO executives. 
Female Indicator equal to one for female CEO; zero, otherwise. 
Ln(CEOAge) The logged value of CEO age. 
CEO_OWN The percentage of outstanding common shares held by a CEO. 
CEO_Chair Indicator equal to one for CEO also chairing the board; zero, otherwise. 
Ln(TotalAssets) The logged book value of total assets in 2000 US million dollars. 
FirmAge 
 
One plus the number of years from the firm’s IPO or the number of years since its first 
appearance in CRSP.  
Segment 
 












The ratio of research and development expenditures to property, plant, and equipment. It is 
set to zero, if the data is missing. 
RDUM Dummy variable equal to one if R&D data is available; zero, otherwise. 
Risk 
 
Variance of residuals from the market model estimated using daily data for the period covered 
by the annual sample. It is equal to zero, if the data to construct Risk are unavailable.  
RiskD 
 




The percentage of new top four non-CEO executives who were not on the list of top four non-
CEO executive positions in the previous year. 
CEO_Turnover 
 
CEO turnover indicator equal to one, if the CEO in year t-2 is different from the CEO in year t; 
zero, otherwise. 
MA The number of completed mergers and acquisitions in a given year. 





The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with independent directors through 
past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board), educational 
institutions, and past membership to social and professional organizations. Only network ties 
established during overlapping years are included. 
Dir_Tie_Unknow 
 
The percent of the independent directors whose pre-existing network ties to their CEOs are 




Appendix 2: Pre-existing Network Ties between Independent Directors and the CEO. 
 
Pre-existing social connections between the CEO and independent directors are measured by 
network ties formed prior to their appointments. BoardEx provides information about directors’ and 
CEOs’ past employment, education background, and membership in social organizations (e.g., 
philanthropic and religious organizations, social clubs, and professional organizations).  We count the 
number of network ties for each category (past employment, education, or membership in social 
organizations) to capture the depth of past connections. To be included, network ties must be 
established during overlapping years. For example, in the case of education, the years a CEO and an 
independent director attended a same school must overlap. Then we sum the three types of ties to 
arrive at the total number of ties. Similar measures of social connections have been used in previous 
papers (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2013; Fracassi and Tate, 
2012; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012). 
Table A provides difference-in-difference estimates for the log of one plus the total number of 
pre-existing network ties a CEO has with independent directors. The key independent variable and 
control variables are the same as the baseline difference-in-differences specification, except we add the 
number of independent directors, Num_Ind_Dir, as a control because the number of pre-existing 
network ties is likely to increase with more independent directors and Dir_Tie_Unknow to account for 
missing or incomplete information on network ties. We also exclude variables specifically related to FTA: 
FTA_1Y, EXECSEN, KNOWN, and FTA_1Y_Unknown. These variables are also excluded in constructing the 
propensity-score matched sample for the analysis of network ties.  
We start the sample period from 2000 because BoardEx provides limited coverage prior to 2000 
and the dependent variable is the total number of network ties. However, when network ties are used 




The estimation results in Table A show a positive and significant coefficient on 
Dep_Board2001*Post at the five percent level for the unmatched sample. For the propensity-score 
matched sample, the coefficient is positive but the P-value is 0.174. Given the shorter sample period and 
the relatively high frequency of missing or incomplete information on network ties, we interpret these 
results as being supportive of the conjecture by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) that if regulation forces a 
board to appoint more independent directors than endogenously determined, the firm will attempt to 





































Table A: Difference-in-Differences Estimation of Pre-existing Network Ties between 
Independent Directors and the CEO. 
 
This table estimates the effect of the independent board requirement on pre-established social 
connections between the CEO and independent directors. The dependent variable is the log of 
one plus the total number of all pre-existing network ties between independent directors and 
the CEO. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period is 2000 – 
2006, excluding 2002. All regressions control for year- and firm fixed effects. The regression 
does not include Dep_Board2001 and Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level in 
Column (1) and are corrected by bootstrapping 200 times in Column (2). Coefficients marked 





 (1) (2) 
Dep_Board2001*Post 0.074** 0.045 
 
(0.032) (0.028) 
Dir_Tie_Unknow -0.186* -0.148 
 
(0.108) (0.171) 
CEOTEN 0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
OUTSIDE -0.042 0.033 
 
(0.067) (0.094) 
Female 0.070 0.126 
 
(0.160) (0.193) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.689*** 0.638** 
 
(0.187) (0.261) 
CEO_OWNt-1 0.081 0.233 
 
(0.200) (0.347) 
CEO_Chair 0.001 -0.017 
 
(0.052) (0.066) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.008 0.014 
 
(0.026) (0.036) 
FirmAge 0.004 -0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Segmentt-1 -0.002 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Num_Ind_Dir 0.051*** 0.063*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) 
Constant -2.739*** -2.668** 
 
(0.767) (1.045) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y 
Observations 3,992 1,793 
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Table 1: Sample Description. 
 
This table shows the number of observations for unmatched and matched samples, by year, in Panels A and B, 
respectively. Columns (1) and (5) report the number of firms for which we have information on both board 
composition in 2001 and the fraction of top-executives appointed (FTA) during a CEO’s tenure. Column (2) reports 
the percent of sample firms satisfying the majority requirement of independent directors in the unmatched sample. 
Columns (3) and (6) report the number of firms without a majority of independent directors in 2001 and, hence, 
affected by the regulation. Columns (4) and (7) show the number of firms unaffected by the regulation for 
unmatched and matched sample.  
 
  Panel A: Unmatched Sample Panel B: PS-matched Sample 
 Year Full 




Affected Unaffected Full  Affected Unaffected 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1996 691 76.95 106 585 296 104 192 
1997 755 75.92 113 642 318 110 208 
1998 825 79.96 128 697 355 125 230 
1999 913 83.30 147 766 390 145 245 
2000 946 84.48 156 790 402 153 249 
2001 944 85.57 157 787 410 157 253 
2003 958 92.43 164 794 403 152 251 
2004 969 94.07 171 798 405 154 251 
2005 978 94.94 171 807 400 152 248 
2006 996 95.25 182 814 400 154 246 
Total 
Obs. 8,975 87.44 1,495 7,480 3,779 1,406 2,373 
Total 





Table 2: Summary Statistics. 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the unmatched full sample. Panel B compares firms affected and unaffected by the regulation in 
the propensity-score (PS) matched sample. The comparison is based on the mean value of variables at the time of matching, the base-
year 2001. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
 Panel A: Unmatched Sample Panel B: PS-matched Sample 
      Mean   
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Affected Unaffected Diff P-Value 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (6)-(7) 
 Board Composition Variables 
Dep_Board2001 0.167 0.000 0.373 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
  Pct_Dep_Board2001 0.351 0.333 0.176 0.063 1.000 0.646 0.305 
  Executive Suite Composition Variables 
FTA 0.437 0.500 0.334 0.000 1.000 0.381 0.450 -0.069 0.034 
AFTA 0.034 0.043 0.284 -1.039 0.752 -0.047 0.022 -0.069 0.013 
WFTA 0.415 0.412 0.335 0.000 1.000 0.353 0.430 -0.078 0.017 
WAFTA 0.033 0.025 0.284 -1.016 0.774 -0.054 0.021 -0.075 0.007 
Monitoring Outcome and Shareholder Value Variables 
Ln(CEO_Comp) 7.959 7.940 1.166 -6.908 13.393 7.649 7.884 -0.235 0.058 
CEO_Delta 125.425 8.262 2207.004 0.000 113868.500 164.988 45.414 119.574 0.001 
TobinQ 2.195 1.564 2.899 0.475 105.090 2.127 1.870 0.257 0.070 
Other Variables 
Post 0.435 0.000 0.496 0.000 1.000     Num_Ind_Dir 6.748 7.000 2.502 1.000 22.000 3.429 6.536 -3.107 0.000 
BoardSize 9.795 9.000 2.842 4.000 30.000 9.599 9.364 0.235 0.399 
CEOTEN 6.920 5.000 7.334 0.000 55.000 9.847 6.901 2.946 0.001 
OUTSIDE 0.142 0.000 0.349 0.000 1.000 0.191 0.134 0.057 0.125 
FTA_1Y 0.538 0.500 0.399 0.000 1.000 0.572 0.519 0.053 0.202 
KNOWN 0.973 1.000 0.093 0.000 1.000 0.971 0.983 -0.012 0.136 
EXECSEN 4.350 4.000 1.872 0.000 14.750 4.909 4.530 0.378 0.033 
FTA_1Y_Unknown 0.001 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.500 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.205 
Female 0.013 0.000 0.113 0.000 1.000 0.006 0.012 -0.005 0.584 
Ln(CEOAge) 4.015 4.025 0.135 3.466 4.511 4.034 3.999 0.034 0.019 
CEO_OWN 0.023 0.003 0.060 0.000 0.638 0.052 0.023 0.029 0.000 
CEO_Chair 0.657 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 0.605 0.652 -0.047 0.337 
Ln(TotalAssets) 7.765 7.599 1.657 2.227 14.291 7.400 7.431 -0.031 0.837 
FirmAge 26.830 23.000 19.571 1.000 82.000 19.541 23.601 -4.059 0.010 
Segment 15.036 14.000 9.695 1.000 87.000 14.929 16.119 -1.190 0.129 
R&D/PPE 0.244 0.000 0.785 0.000 24.610 0.178 0.200 -0.022 0.704 
RDUM 0.538 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.490 0.545 -0.055 0.279 
Risk 0.022 0.019 0.013 0.000 0.196 0.032 0.031 0.000 0.750 
RiskD 0.936 1.000 0.245 0.000 1.000 0.936 0.988 -0.052 0.004 
EBITDA/TA 0.137 0.133 0.113 -2.989 1.001 0.133 0.134 0.000 0.961 





Table: 3: Relation between Fraction of Top-executives Appointed (FTA) during a CEO’s Tenure and Board 
Independence. 
 
This table estimates the relation between the fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed (FTA) during a CEO’s 
tenure and the percent of independent directors on the board. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, excluding 2002. 
Columns (1) and (2) are OLS and ordered logistic regression estimates, respectively, controlling for year- and firm fixed 
effects and year- and firm dummies.. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 





 (1) (2) 
Pct_Ind_Dir 0.097** 1.412** 
 
(0.043) (0.559) 
CEOTEN 0.019*** 0.317*** 
 
(0.003) (0.055) 
OUTSIDE -0.004 -0.283 
 
(0.039) (0.569) 
FTA_1Y 0.054 0.693 
 
(0.039) (0.609) 
KNOWN -0.366*** -5.607*** 
 
(0.064) (0.956) 
EXECSEN -0.086*** -1.320*** 
 
(0.003) (0.067) 
FTA_1Y_Unknown 0.870 7.676 
 
(0.593) (17.120) 
Female -0.052 -0.843 
 
(0.151) (2.370) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.265** 3.989*** 
 
(0.107) (1.541) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.518** -8.046** 
 
(0.226) (3.519) 
CEO_Chair 0.013 -0.014 
 
(0.030) (0.433) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.035 0.684** 
 
(0.024) (0.275) 
FirmAge 0.002 0.020 
 
(0.001) (0.014) 
Segmentt-1 -0.001 -0.022 
 
(0.001) (0.013) 
Constant -0.697  
 
(0.483)  Firm FE & Year FE (Dummies) Y Y 
Observations 5,687 5,687 




Table 4: Impact of Independent Board Requirement on Fraction of Top-executives Appointed (FTA) 
during a CEO’s Tenure. 
 
This table reports estimates of the impact of the independent board requirement on the fraction of top four non-
CEO executives appointed (FTA) during a CEO’s tenure. Columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) report estimation results with 
the unmatched and propensity-score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, 
excluding 2002. Columns (1) and (3) are OLS estimates; Columns (2) and (4), estimates by ordered logistic 
regressions. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. Regressions in Columns (1) and (3) control for 
year- and firm fixed effects and regressions in Columns (2) and (4) control for year- and firm dummies. The 
regression does not include Dep_Board2001 and Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level in Columns (1)-(2) and are 
corrected by bootstrapping 200 times in Columns (3)-(4). Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant 




 OLS Ologit OLS Ologit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep_Board2001*Post 0.102*** 1.272*** 0.070*** 0.998*** 
 
(0.020) (0.284) (0.013) (0.205) 
CEOTEN 0.019*** 0.305*** 0.015*** 0.286*** 
 
(0.003) (0.047) (0.002) (0.036) 
OUTSIDE 0.004 -0.134 -0.067** -1.384*** 
 
(0.033) (0.466) (0.032) (0.484) 
FTA_1Y 0.091*** 1.151** 0.138*** 2.343*** 
 
(0.035) (0.534) (0.029) (0.455) 
KNOWN -0.308*** -4.262*** -0.453*** -7.174*** 
 
(0.055) (0.772) (0.042) (0.770) 
EXECSEN -0.087*** -1.265*** -0.091*** -1.482*** 
 
(0.003) (0.056) (0.002) (0.063) 
FTA_1Y_Unknown 0.985** 9.882 -0.078 -3.078 
 
(0.449) (10.145) (0.231) (3.169) 
Female -0.106 -1.572 -0.207*** -3.237*** 
 
(0.097) (1.268) (0.075) (0.844) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.216** 2.880** 0.139** 1.032 
 
(0.088) (1.213) (0.064) (1.040) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.453*** -6.087** -0.416*** -5.965*** 
 
(0.163) (2.382) (0.136) (2.026) 
CEO_Chair 0.013 -0.009 0.023 -0.095 
 
(0.026) (0.368) (0.024) (0.391) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.048*** 0.760*** 0.058*** 0.857*** 
 
(0.017) (0.193) (0.011) (0.166) 
FirmAge 0.003*** 0.032*** 0.001 0.017 
 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012) 
Segmentt-1 -0.001* -0.022** -0.001 -0.020* 
 







(0.254)  Firm FE & Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,581 6,581 2,998 2,998 




Table 5: Heterogeneity in the Degree of the Shock by the Board Regulation. 
 
This table examines how changes in the fraction of top-executives appointed (FTA) during a CEO’s 
tenure are related to the degree to which a firm is affected by the independent board requirement. 
The dependent variable is FTA. The key independent variable is Pct_Dep_Board2001*Post, the 
percentage of non-independent directors in 2001 interacted with the post-regulation indicator. The 
regression does not include Pct_Dep_Board2001 and Post as separate controls because of firm- 
and year fixed effects. Panel A and Panel B report estimation results with the unmatched sample 
and the propensity-score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, 
excluding 2002. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. All regressions control for 
year- and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 
firm level in Column (1) and are corrected by bootstrapping 200 times in Column (2). Coefficients 





 (1) (2) 
Pct_Dep_Board2001*Post  0.279*** 0.199*** 
 
(0.048) (0.036) 
CEOTEN 0.018*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
OUTSIDE 0.005 -0.068** 
 
(0.033) (0.031) 
FTA_1Y 0.087** 0.140*** 
 
(0.034) (0.030) 
KNOWN -0.321*** -0.459*** 
 
(0.054) (0.049) 
EXECSEN -0.088*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
FTA_1Y_Unknown 1.016** -0.065 
 
(0.456) (0.218) 
Female -0.118 -0.224*** 
 
(0.098) (0.065) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.211** 0.139** 
 
(0.089) (0.065) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.411** -0.366*** 
 
(0.159) (0.140) 
CEO_Chair 0.014 0.025 
 
(0.026) (0.024) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.048*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.017) (0.013) 
FirmAge 0.003*** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Segmentt-1 -0.002* -0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.571 0.277 
 
(0.394) (0.294) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y 
Observations 6,581 2,998 





Table 6: Confounding Effects. 
Dummy variables 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005 and after are equal to one if the observation is 
in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005-2006, respectively. Panels A and Panel B report results 
estimated with the unmatched and the propensity-score (PS) sample. The sample period is 1996 – 
2006, excluding 2002. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1. All regressions control 
for year- and firm fixed effects. The regression does not include Dep_Board2001 and year indicator 
variables as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level in Column (1) and are corrected by 
bootstrapping 200 times in Column (2). Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 




 (1) (2) 
Dep_Board2001*2000  0.012 -0.000 
 (0.020) (0.019) Dep_Board2001*2001  0.032 0.019 
 (0.024) (0.019) Dep_Board2001*2003  0.080*** 0.055*** 
 (0.024) (0.020) Dep_Board2001*2004  0.102*** 0.069*** 
 (0.027) (0.022) Dep_Board2001*2005 and after  0.133*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.028) (0.021) 
CEOTEN 0.019*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
OUTSIDE 0.004 -0.067** 
 
(0.033) (0.031) 
FTA_1Y 0.091*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.035) (0.030) 
KNOWN -0.308*** -0.454*** 
 
(0.055) (0.055) 
EXECSEN -0.087*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
FTA_1Y_Unknown 0.974** -0.084 
 
(0.450) (0.238) 
Female -0.107 -0.209*** 
 
(0.097) (0.068) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.215** 0.139** 
 
(0.088) (0.068) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.447*** -0.410*** 
 
(0.163) (0.126) 
CEO_Chair 0.013 0.023 
 
(0.026) (0.022) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.048*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.017) (0.011) 
FirmAge 0.003*** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Segmentt-1 -0.001* -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.600 0.351 
 
(0.389) (0.275) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y 
Observations 6,581 2,998 




Table 7: Alternative Explanations. 
This table re-estimates the OLS regressions in Table 4 to test whether the results can be explained by executive turnovers or major 
structural changing events. The dependent variables are FTA. Panel A controls for executive turnovers and CEO turnovers. 
Pct_Exe_Turnover is the fraction of new top four non-CEO executives who were not on the list of the top four non-CEO executives in 
the previous year; CEO_Turnover, a dummy variable equal to one if the CEOs in year t and in year t-2 are not the same. Panel B controls 
for the number of completed mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and spinoffs. MA is the number of completed mergers and acquisitions 
in a given year. DS is the number of completed divestitures and spinoffs in a given year. Columns (1) and (3) and Columns (2) and (4) 
report results estimated with the unmatched and the propensity-score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 
2006, excluding 2002. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. All regressions include all control variables in Table 4. The 
regression does not include Dep_Board2001 and Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level in Columns (1) and (3) and are corrected by bootstrapping 200 times in 
Columns (2) and (4). Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES FTA 
 
Panel A: Are Results Driven by 
Executive Turnover? 
Panel B: Are Results Driven by 
Structural Changing Events? 
 
Unmatched PS-matched Unmatched PS-matched 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pct_Dep_Board2001*Post  0.089*** 0.060*** 0.101*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.014) 
Pct_Exe_Turnover 0.111*** 0.099*** 
   (0.017) (0.021)   CEO_Turnover -0.173*** -0.161*** 
   (0.008) (0.010)   MAt-1 
  
-0.002 -0.002 





   
(0.004) (0.005) 
CEOTEN 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
OUTSIDE 0.009 -0.053* 0.004 -0.067** 
 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) 
FTA_1Y 0.092*** 0.135*** 0.091*** 0.138*** 
 
(0.032) (0.024) (0.035) (0.033) 
KNOWN -0.386*** -0.518*** -0.308*** -0.454*** 
 
(0.049) (0.044) (0.055) (0.052) 
EXECSEN -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
FTA_1Y_Unknown 0.750** 0.043 0.968** -0.079 
 
(0.299) (0.223) (0.454) (0.217) 
Female -0.099 -0.222*** -0.107 -0.207*** 
 
(0.093) (0.068) (0.097) (0.073) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.181** 0.109* 0.214** 0.135** 
 
(0.082) (0.059) (0.089) (0.060) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.382** -0.302** -0.451*** -0.415*** 
 
(0.150) (0.130) (0.164) (0.139) 
CEO_Chair 0.004 0.015 0.013 0.023 
 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.042*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) 
FirmAge 0.002** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Segmentt-1 -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.287 0.601** -0.610 0.357 
 
(0.361) (0.244) (0.390) (0.254) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,581 2,998 6,581 2,998 




Table 8: Alternative Definitions of FTA.  
 
This table re-estimates the OLS regressions in Table 4 with three alternative measures of FTA. WFTA is FTA weighted by 
the sum of executives’ salaries and bonuses; AFTA, an abnormal measure of FTA; and WAFTA, an abnormal measure of 
WFTA. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. Panels A and B report results estimated with the 
unmatched sample and the propensity-score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, 
excluding 2002. All regressions control for firm- and year fixed effects. The regression does not include Dep_Board2001 
and Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are 
clustered at the firm level in Panel A and are corrected by bootstrapping 200 times in Panel B. Coefficients marked with 
*, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Unmatched Panel B: PS-matched 
VARIABLES WFTA AFTA WAFTA WFTA AFTA WAFTA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pct_Dep_Board2001*Post  0.095*** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 0.067*** 
 

















































  Female -0.145 -0.081 -0.120 -0.259*** -0.157* -0.201* 
 
(0.099) (0.108) (0.109) (0.089) (0.088) (0.106) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.203** 0.364*** 0.360*** 0.141** 0.251*** 0.268*** 
 
(0.091) (0.069) (0.070) (0.067) (0.051) (0.048) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.433*** -0.307* -0.287* -0.426*** -0.238* -0.246* 
 
(0.161) (0.166) (0.161) (0.125) (0.137) (0.142) 
CEO_Chair 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.020 0.009 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
FirmAge 0.003** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Segmentt-1 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.598 -1.986*** -1.976*** 0.353 -1.710*** -1.788*** 
 
(0.400) (0.293) (0.300) (0.292) (0.195) (0.177) 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y N N Y N N 
Observations 6,581 6,581 6,581 2,998 2,998 2,998 





Table 9: Interactive Effects of Changes in FTA and the Board Regulation on CEO Compensation and Firm Value. 
 
This table estimates how changes in FTA after the board regulation, ∆FTA, affect the impact of the independent 
board requirement on CEO compensation and firm value. The dependent variables are changes in total CEO 
compensation in Column (1); changes in CEO Delta in Column (2); and changes in Tobin’s Q in Column (3). The 
sample is cross-sectional and each observation is the difference in the averages of up to four years over 1998-2001 
and 2003-2006 that overlap with the tenure of each CEO who was the CEO in 2001. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level, as 
defined by 3-digit SIC. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES ∆Ln(CEO_Comp) ∆CEO_Delta ∆Tobin's Q 
  (1) (2) (3) 
∆FTA*Dep_Board2001 0.654** -434.887* -1.405 
 
(0.269) (243.558) (1.066) 
Dep_Board2001 -0.191 209.629 0.275 
 
(0.117) (131.439) (0.285) 
∆FTA -0.239* 401.187 -1.303* 
 
(0.134) (273.468) (0.742) 
∆Dir_Tie 0.023 -9.000 -0.100 
 
(0.021) (30.517) (0.114) 
∆Dir_Tie_UnKnown 0.007 -251.682* -0.960 
 
(0.111) (150.405) (0.854) 
∆Ln(TotalAssets) 0.288*** -155.027 -1.629*** 
 
(0.069) (98.965) (0.452) 
∆Segment -0.000 -5.507 0.010 
 
(0.007) (14.000) (0.016) 




 ∆R&D/PPE 0.078 -190.449 0.059 
 
(0.188) (128.191) (0.731) 
∆RDUM 0.108 85.431 0.325 
 
(0.128) (99.434) (0.450) 
∆Risk 5.681* 7,089.039 -17.324 
 
(3.065) (5,855.998) (33.163) 
∆RiskD -0.342** -214.414 -1.044 
 
(0.173) (269.327) (1.043) 
Constant 0.298*** -142.349 0.273* 
 
(0.062) (88.528) (0.144) 
Observations 705 705 644 





Table 10: Interactive Effects of the Capacity to Increase FTA and the Board Regulation on CEO Compensation and 
Firm Value. 
 
This table estimates how the effect of the independent board requirement on CEO compensation and firm value varies across 
pre-regulation FTA, as measured by FTA in 2001. The dependent variables are total CEO compensation in Columns (1)-(2); CEO 
Delta in Columns (3)-(4); and Tobin’s Q in Columns (5)-(6).  The sample period is 1996-2006, excluding 2002. The sample 
excludes observations in which CEOs are not the CEOs in 2001. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. All 
regressions control for firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm 
level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES Ln(CEO_Comp) CEO_Delta Tobin's Q 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep_Board2001*Post -0.051 0.144 119.494* -25.444 -0.008 -0.251 
 



























Dir_Tie 0.027 0.027* -25.225 -25.210 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (26.777) (26.535) (0.016) (0.016) 
Dir_Tie_UnKnown -0.475*** -0.485*** -29.833 28.603 -0.784*** -0.704*** 
 
(0.165) (0.164) (412.497) (423.467) (0.274) (0.272) 
CEOTEN 0.016 0.024 2.332 21.329 0.016 0.037* 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (27.142) (24.531) (0.018) (0.019) 
Ln(CEOAge) 2.999*** 2.998*** -1,975.147 -1,597.387 -0.752 -0.255 
 
(0.991) (0.827) (1,579.363) (1,462.282) (1.014) (1.035) 
Ln(TotalAssets)t-1 0.147*** 0.147*** -130.319 -140.850 -0.912*** -0.924*** 
 
(0.043) (0.040) (217.886) (216.901) (0.166) (0.166) 
FirmAge -0.000 -0.001 2.631 3.175 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (3.473) (3.586) (0.003) (0.003) 
Segmentt-1 0.000 0.000 16.242 15.398 0.008* 0.007 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (16.652) (16.356) (0.005) (0.005) 
EBITDA/TAt-1 2.141*** 2.134*** -441.762 -572.189 
  
 
(0.304) (0.228) (608.234) (621.250) 
  R&D/PPEt-1 0.055 0.046 52.792 38.505 0.331 0.320 
 
(0.071) (0.046) (163.255) (160.113) (0.312) (0.311) 
RDUMt-1 0.010 0.010 57.006 42.441 0.009 -0.010 
 
(0.092) (0.105) (54.407) (52.783) (0.155) (0.156) 
Riskt-1 2.844 2.509 2,827.328 1,385.989 -11.242 -12.792 
 
(1.872) (1.747) (5,093.844) (4,652.129) (7.901) (7.929) 
RiskDt-1 -0.087 -0.075 -83.417 -43.374 -0.122 -0.076 
 
(0.073) (0.081) (129.960) (114.521) (0.188) (0.183) 
Constant -5.612 -5.636* 8,799.366 7,288.745 12.139*** 10.120** 
 
(3.825) (3.158) (6,628.813) (6,232.016) (4.431) (4.466) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,845 4,845 4,845 4,845 4,444 4,444 
Adjusted-R2 0.651 0.651 0.185 0.186 0.642 0.643 
 
